Rahul's comments call into question his understanding of issues

By Swapan Dasgupta in Pioneer.

When the second volume of the Mitrokhin Archive was W published in 2005, there was understandable nervousness in Whitehall over its possible impact on bilatera relations with India. The contents of Vasili Mitrokhin's notes o KGB's worldwide operations, as gleamed from the agency's own archives, were hugely sensitive. This was particularly true of the sections on India, where the KGB had managed to penetrate deep into the political establishment. Having carefully vetted and sanitised the papers to negate any possible damage to reputations of the great and good and facilitated its publication, the British Government was nevertheless worried that that the erstwhile `friends of the Soviet Union' would direct their ire at the messenger, if only to divert attention from the explosive details of how India wa systematically compromised.
Whitehall's apprehensions turned out to be completely unfounded. The Mitrokhin Archive attracted some editorial comment but didn't create even a political ripple. The attempts by some concerned Opposition MPs to raise the subject was peremptorily disallowed on the astonishing ground that it was not the job of Parliament to deliberate on books of `fiction'.
Compared to the indifference that greeted the Mitrokhin Archive, the WikiLeaks files emanating from the US Embassy in New Delhi have created a political storm. Some of the excitement is understandable: Mitrokhin's revelations centred on events that were regarded as history while the WikiLeaks disclosures have a contemporary resonance.
Moreover, those who vetted Mitrokhin's notes were meticulous in ensuring that names of politicians and officials who served as KGB `assets' were not divulged. The WikiLeaks releases aren't CIA reports; they are Embassy cables concerned with either political assessments or conversations with `open' sources, sometimes in structured meetings. As such, the cables aren't squeamish about the identities of politicians and officials.
Despite these obvious differences, it is worth noting that throughout last Friday the Congress spokespersons fell back on a variant of the `fiction' argument that killed the debate on Mitrokhin in 2005. Although the authenticity of the cables wasn't questioned (except by the gentleman who whiffed a "conspiracy"), it was argued that there was nothing "official" about WikiLeaks. Therefore, the disclosures weren't worthy of being dignified. They were, Congress spokespersons claimed insouciantly, at best, individual assessments peppered with reports of conversations torn out of context.
There was, predictably, no mention of the fact that just prior to the first instalment of WikiLeaks, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had alerted world capitals of the possible embarrassment from their disclosures. It is possible the Congress wouldn't have bothered with WikiLeaks had Rahul Gandhi's conversation with the US Ambassador at a lunch hosted by the Prime Minister on July 20, 2009, not featured in the disclosures.
The earlier release of a report on the Congress trying to play identity politics with the 26/11 Mumbai attacks hadn't resulted in a flurry of clarifications and explanations. And rightly so since the US Embassy cable was an assessment based on public statements. on public statements.
Nor was there excitement over the unflattering assessment of Sonia Gandhi's leadership during the stalemate on the nuclear debate. The colourful charge that the Congress president doesn't miss any opportunity to miss an opportunity was the Ambassador's assessment. Envoys are expected to provide such blunt reports to headquarters in confidence. Just because WikiLeaks breached that confidentiality doesn't undermine the validity of the exercise.
Nor does it suggest that any US desire to be implacably hostile to the lady. Diplomacy is rarely conducted on such black and white terms, not even by the US.
The importance of Rahul Gandhi's conversation with the US Ambassador won't be found within the framework of India-US bilateral ties. Rahul's suggestion that "radicalised Hindu groups" posed a "bigger threat" to India than the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba didn't lead to the US immediately discounting all that India had said about the 26/11 attack.
The US has its own counter-terrorism establishment that does its own assessments, and it is highly unlikely that any of its functionaries had reason to conclude that Abhinav Bharat was the new Hindu Al Qaeda. The conversation was important not for what it reveals about the Government's approach to internal security, but for its insights into the mind of India's "elusive" heir designate.
Rahul is not merely "elusive" for American diplomats; he has also eluded all meaningful interrogation of his views by Indians. Apart from his template speech on the two India's, Indians know precious little or nothing about the heir designate's views on subjects of crucial importance to the country. What does he think of Jammu & Kashmir, apart from his friendship with Omar Abdullah? What has he to say on foreign policy, economic strategies and education? Indians are as clueless about the man tipped to succeed Manmohan Singh. Rahul has kept his views severely rationed.
Unfortunately for Rahul, this non-scripted account of his view on internal security doesn't suggest a grasp of the subject. If Rahul thinks that the terror version of the kachchhabaniyan gang that worked the badlands of Uttar Pradesh is a "greater threat" to India than the LeT -and that too just eight months after 26/11 -it calls into question his understanding of issues. Worse, by revealing his zany views to the Ambassador of a country whose assistance has been sought to tame Pakistan, he has shown an incredible lack of judgement.
Some people have greatness thrust on them. This Emperor-to-be, it now emerges, has no clothes.